A New Physicalist Response to the Knowledge Argument by Swanepoel,Danielle
Journal of Consciousness Studies, 23, No. 3–4, 2016, pp. ?–? 
Danielle Swanepoel 
Bifactualism 
A New Physicalist Response 
to the Knowledge Argument 
Abstract: The knowledge argument is an argument for dualism that 
claims that there are both physical and non-physical facts, something 
we can know by reflecting on ‘Mary’ who is aware of all scientific 
data about colours but has yet to see any. I reject the dualist con-
clusion and instead provide a new physicalist response that I call 
‘bifactualism’. Bifactualism is a novel physicalist account comprising 
two elements. First, like dualism, it distinguishes between two kinds of 
facts: general and particular facts. Second, unlike dualism, it claims 
that the general/particular distinction (and not any physical/non-
physical distinction) may explain facts about experience. There are 
certain facts that go undocumented in what is expressible in the 
language of the physical sciences because the language of the 
physical sciences concerns only general facts, whereas experience, I 
argue, essentially involves learning particular facts. Thus I argue that 
the case of Mary does not support mind/body dualism, and instead 
provides at least equal reason to support bifactualism. Since the 
general/particular distinction is one we are stuck with regardless of 
the status of mind, bifactualism emerges as a more parsimonious and 
hence preferable account of experience. 
1. Introduction 
What kind of fact do we learn when we experience something? 
According to several theorists, the kind of fact we learn from experi-
ence tells us something about the nature of the mind. Experience gives 
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us a certain kind of knowledge which seems different from the kind of 
knowledge we can get from sciences for instance. Because the knowl-
edge obtained through experience seems different from knowledge we 
may learn from a book, many theorists, from both dualist and 
physicalist camps, have debated whether this knowledge gained 
through experience is physical knowledge or non-physical knowledge. 
Frank Jackson provides a famous formulation of this debate in a 
thought experiment, the hypothetical results of which form the basis 
of the knowledge argument. In this paper I propose a novel analysis of 
this argument in terms of a distinction between particular and general 
facts. Following on from this analysis, I put forward a view, which I 
call bifactualism,1 which does justice to the knowledge argument 
while still maintaining that all facts are physical. 
As mentioned above, the nature of what we learn through experi-
ence is very important in the dualist/physicalist debate; and, because 
of this, a lot of time and effort has been invested in Frank Jackson’s 
knowledge argument. In ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ (1982), Jackson 
introduces a thought experiment whereby a scientist by the name of 
Mary is able to learn all physical facts in a black and white room and 
when she leaves the room she learns something else. The nature of this 
something else she learns is problematic for both dualists and 
physicalists. 
In this paper I introduce a view I call bifactualism. Bifactualism is a 
physicalist account which comprises two elements. First, it 
distinguishes between two kinds of facts: general facts and particular 
facts. Second, it claims that this distinction could explain facts about 
experience. This view enjoys a distinct advantage over alternative 
views outlined in this paper. Not only does it address the kind of 
knowledge Mary gains both in and out of the black and white room, as 
so many others have (Jackson, 1982; Lewis, 1988; Nemirow, 1980; 
2007; Churchland, 1989; Chalmers, 1996; Alter and Walter, 2007); it 
also addresses the physicality or non-physicality of these newly 
acquired facts, which many theorists neglect to do. Bifactualism says a 
bit more about the type of fact Mary learns and concludes that these 
facts are indeed physical. 
The remainder of this paper is divided into six sections. In Section 
2, I give an account of the knowledge argument according to Jackson. 
                                                          
1  This paper is based on work done by Swanepoel (2013) Bifactualism: A Physicalist 
Account of Experience, unpublished manuscript, University of Johannesburg. 
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In Section 3, I explore the semantic theory of indexical expressions as 
offering a possible response to the knowledge argument. I refer to this 
as the indexical response (following David Chalmers). The indexical 
response appears promising, and has something right about it, but it 
suffers from insurmountable difficulties. The difficulties include the 
truth value of indexical claims, the status of indexicals with regards to 
factual knowledge, and the uniqueness of indexical claims with 
regards to the location of an agent in relation to an object. In Section 
4, I introduce the view I call bifactualism, and indicate how it 
improves upon the indexical response, overcoming the central diffi-
culties for that response while preserving what seems right about it. In 
Section 5, I examine some objections and possible replies to these 
objections; and lastly I conclude by exploring whether and how 
bifactualism could be a view which should be considered a serious 
contender in the dualism/physicalism debate. 
2. The Knowledge Argument 
Frank Jackson presented the knowledge argument in his paper titled 
‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’ in 1982. Jackson introduces a thought experi-
ment about Mary, the neuroscientist. Mary has spent her entire life in 
a black and white room specializing in the neurophysiology of vision 
and is therefore an expert in wavelength combinations of colours and 
their effect on the eye and brain. She learns all these physical facts 
from what the language of the physical sciences is able to tell her. 
Jackson claims that ‘[t]he physical sciences tell us a great deal about 
what our world is like. They also tell us a great deal about what we are 
like. They tell us, for example, that our bodies are made up of the stuff 
that the physical sciences — physics, chemistry and biology — talk 
about’ (Jackson, 2003, p. 1).2 After a few years of learning all the 
                                                          
2  Whenever I refer to what is expressible in the language of the physical sciences I am 
referring to the kind of knowledge available to Mary through physics, chemistry, 
biology, and the like, which is what I believe Jackson was alluding to when he made 
claims about the physicalist story (Jackson, 1982; 2003). Initially, I referred to this as 
the language of physics because the ‘root notion of physicalism is “physics” and, 
second, that “physics” includes more than simply “matter”’ (Stoljar, 2010, p. 10). 
McGee (1991, p. 76) writes that linguistic physicalism is the ‘doctrine that every 
(genuine) property can be described within the language of physics’ and that ‘every 
scientifically legitimate general term is coextensive with some open sentence of the 
language of physics’ (ibid., p. 77). However, an anonymous referee pointed out that it is 
debateable as to whether all other sciences can really be strictly reduced to what is 
expressible in the language of physics and to the laws of physics, and many theorists 
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physical facts there are to know about colour, Mary is released from 
the black and white room and sees colour for the first time. 
Jackson concludes that Mary, in her room, lacks a certain kind of 
knowledge which cannot be gained by learning the physical facts 
expressible in the language of the physical sciences. Jackson is saying 
that ‘physicalism is knowledge about the experiences of others, not 
about her own’ (Jackson, 1982, p. 278). He goes further to state that if 
physicalism is true, then Mary, by learning all the physical facts about 
colour, knows all there is to know about colour. It is important to note 
the two claims this argument makes: firstly, that before her release 
Mary learned and subsequently knows everything there is to know 
about the physical facts of colour; and secondly, that when Mary 
escapes from her room, upon experience, she learns something new. 
She apparently learns the feeling of what it is like (Nagel, 1974) to 
experience something and this is also sometimes referred to as qualia 
(Jackson, 1982).Therefore, what she learns cannot be a physical fact 
because she knows all the physical facts already. 
In the knowledge argument, Jackson does little to show how any 
interaction takes place between these qualia and physical properties. 
This is no fault of his, since the knowledge argument is concerned 
with the type of knowledge she learns, not necessarily how she comes 
to learn it. In actual fact, showing the interaction between non-
physical properties and physical properties is a major problem in 
philosophy of mind. Physicalists reject any interaction between the 
two by claiming that it seems implausible that non-physical properties 
are causal in any physical way, and thus it is implausible that qualia 
play any part in why we do things, if qualia are non-physical 
properties as the dualist maintains. 
The causal closure of the physical stipulates that every event has a 
sufficient physical cause (Kim, 2005). Thus, on a dualist view of 
qualia, qualia have no effect upon the physical. A well-used example 
is that of being in a state of pain. For functionalists, for instance, being 
in a state of pain is being in a certain brain state that is pain. For 
dualists,3 pain is a quale. When a person touches a hot stove, pain is 
                                                                                                                  
have argued that this reduction is not possible (Crane and Mellor, 2002; Piercey, 2013). 
This is a debate I did not want to get into here and therefore I decided to instead use 
‘what is expressible in the language of the physical sciences’ as the kind of knowledge 
Mary had access to in the black and white room. 
3  In this paper, I do not explore different kinds of dualism and physicalism as it is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Instead, when I refer to dualist views, I refer to the view that 
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felt which (may) cause the person to rapidly withdraw her hand. It is 
debateable as to whether the pain is the cause for the withdrawal from 
the source of pain. Some theorists (Bayne, Cleeremans and Wilken, 
2009) argue that there is a time delay of conscious awareness which 
does not directly coincide with action: ‘It seems likely that the action 
was initiated independently of the experience of pain’ (ibid., p. 317). 
Dualists have a hard time explaining how this feeling of pain (a non-
physical property) sends a message to the body to cause the with-
drawal of the hand from the source of pain. Physicalists have tried to 
overcome this problem of interaction or causation by claiming that 
this pain state is purely a brain state. 
Above, I gave a version of the knowledge argument that approxi-
mates to Jackson’s original 1982 presentation. However, the argument 
was refined in subsequent treatments. Chalmers (2002, p. 250) offers 
the following representation of the knowledge argument: 
 (1) Mary knows all the physical facts. 
 (2) Mary does not know all the facts. 
 Hence, (3) the physical facts do not exhaust all the facts. 
While there have been various other versions (Alter, 1998; Alter and 
Walter, 2007; Jackson, 1986), I confine my attention to this standard 
and simple version; throughout this paper I consider other renditions 
but for obvious reasons do not look at all the possible versions of the 
knowledge argument as this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3. The Indexical Response 
to the Knowledge Argument 
In this section I focus on indexicals and consider whether their 
semantic analysis offers a response to the knowledge argument. It 
seems that the indexical response is less explored than other responses 
to the knowledge argument and I find this interesting, given the over-
all contribution a much revised version can offer to the claims made in 
the knowledge argument. It is my aim here to show how the indexical 
response has some merit (albeit with problems) in showing how some 
claims made in the knowledge argument are mistaken. Firstly, I am 
going to give a brief definition of what an indexical is. Secondly, I am 
going to review some important contributions by John Perry (1979). 
                                                                                                                  
there exist non-physical properties as well as physical properties or that there exists 
another type of property which is not reducible to the physical. 
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Thirdly, I discuss Chalmers’ view on how indexicals impact on the 
knowledge argument. My next move is to show that the knowledge 
argument makes a mistake by conflating indexical and non-indexical 
knowledge. This is considered a somewhat standard response to the 
knowledge argument, but this move is important to show how the 
indexical response could be revised. 
Let’s begin with the definition. An example of an indexical state-
ment would be if you walk into your office and you see your notebook 
lying on the table, and say to yourself: ‘That’s where I put my 
notebook… this is where I left it yesterday.’ Related to Mary, an 
example of an indexical statement would be if Mary comes out of the 
black and white room and says: ‘Oh, so this is what it is like for me to 
see that red rose over there.’ Her ability to say this sentence is based 
on the fact that she is occupying a space in relation to an object and is 
therefore able to make a reference to the object in a way that others, 
who are not in that similar situation, cannot. Therefore, indexical 
expressions are statements, claims, or references that can only be 
made when an agent occupies a certain relation to an object. 
Perry sees a link between indexical statements and the kind of 
knowledge Mary learns once she leaves the black and white room. He 
claims that ‘just as epiphenomenalism is the real issue with the 
zombie argument, the subject matter assumption is the real issue with 
Mary. Those who hold it… [the subject matter assumption], dualist or 
physicalist, have a problem with Mary’s knowledge. Those who reject 
it, dualist or physicalist, do not’ (Perry, 1999, p. 145). The subject 
matter assumption Perry speaks of here is related to the fact that the 
knowledge argument is interesting to those who see a gap in the 
knowledge between what is learned in the black and white room and 
what is learned outside of the black and white room. The knowledge 
argument holds no interest to those who see no gap in the knowledge 
that Mary learns and comes to learn. Perry has a problem with the 
subject matter assumption and therefore puts forward an indexical 
response to the knowledge argument. The problematic claim made in 
the knowledge argument is that Mary comes to learn something new 
upon experience. He recalls that the only way to attend to a subjective 
character of experience is while one is having this subjective character 
of experience. 
According to Perry, physicalists should not be sceptical as to the 
nature of the subjective character of experience because, if we are 
convinced of physicalism, the existence of qualia do not disprove 
physicalism but rather are regarded as consisting purely of physical 
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states and processes (Perry, 1999, p. 145). This is closely related to the 
causal closure of the physical I briefly discussed above. Perry claims 
that certain physicalists would argue ‘that experiences are brain 
events, and qualia are real physical properties of those brain events’ 
(Perry, 2001). When we are in the process of experiencing our sub-
jective character, we communicate these experiences by using the 
flexible demonstrative ‘this’. A flexible demonstrative is used to 
indicate ‘this feeling is the one I’ve been having’, Perry also refers to 
this particular use of ‘this’ as an inner demonstrative (Perry, 1999, p. 
146). 
According to Perry (ibid., p. 146), Mary, in the confinement of the 
black and white room, is able to make the following claim: 
 (1) QR is what it’s like to see red. 
When Mary is finally able to see a red tomato for herself, she is able 
to make use of the following expressions: 
 (2) Thisi is what it is like to see red. 
 (3) QR is thisi subjective character. 
Perry further labels the beliefs expressed in (1), (2), and (3) as b1, b2, 
b3. Thus, for the physicalist, the following is true: 
 ‘QR is a physical state, a physical aspect of the normal experi-
ence of seeing red. 
 (1), (2), and (3) are true. 
 When Mary leaves Jackson’s room she learns something new, 
by forming the new true beliefs b2 and b3 that she expresses 
with (2) and (3).’ 
Perry identifies this kind of new knowledge as recognition (in line 
with Lewis’s, 1988, and Nemirow’s, 2007, ability hypothesis). 
With regards to the knowledge argument, b1 is a detached belief 
Mary has about the seeing the colour red. She has formed this 
detached belief based on the information she gleans from the books 
and other forms of information she has available in the black and 
white room because she is not ‘connected to an act of attending to a 
subjective character’ (Perry, 1999, p. 147). Belief b2, however, is 
attached to a particular experience and therefore this belief is attached 
to that experience. For Perry (ibid., p. 148), the subject truth-
conditions of (2) are exactly the same as those of (1). Perry states that 
a subject truth-condition is such that a belief is strongly attached to the 
idea of self-notion. This belief is based on ‘the person that owns the 
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notion; that is who such beliefs are about’ (Perry, 2002, p. 238). 
Therefore, when Mary sees red and is able to form a belief based on 
this act, she has an ownership of that belief as a self-notion. The 
reflexive truth-conditions4 of b2 are different [in that] b2 is true iff the 
act of inner attention to which it is attached is of the subjective 
character of the experience of seeing red’ (Perry, 1999, p. 148). Perry 
gets around the problem set out in Jackson’s knowledge argument by 
suggesting that b3 ‘is true iff the act of inner attention to which it is 
attached is of the origin of Mary’s QR concept’ (ibid.). Thus, for Perry, 
Mary comes to learn a new truth-condition on Mary’s beliefs which 
occurred when she saw a tomato for the first time and learned the 
subjective character of that experience. For Perry, no new fact is 
learned but rather a change in belief of an old concept. This change of 
belief is cemented by Mary’s ability to use an indexical expression 
such as ‘this is what it is like to see red’. 
Chalmers notes that Perry’s ‘response, essentially, is to analyze 
phenomenal knowledge as a sort of indexical knowledge’ (Chalmers, 
2004, p. 184), that is, as knowledge of the truth of indexical 
expressions. He also rightly notes that indexical knowledge is such 
that it is not deducible from a complete knowledge of what is physical 
(this I will discuss in more detail later). Perry’s strategy, as Chalmers 
sees it, is to explain the epistemic gap between what is physical and 
what is phenomenal by maintaining that phenomenal knowledge is a 
species of indexical knowledge. Chalmers (2004, p. 185) states, in 
response, that phenomenal knowledge is not indexical knowledge as 
he claims that ‘indexicals accompany facts about conscious experi-
ence in their failure to supervene logically on physical facts, but they 
are all settled by the addition of a thin “indexical fact” about the 
location of the agent in question’ (Chalmers, 1996, p. 144). 
According to Chalmers, Mary, in the black and white room, is 
ignorant of what it is like to see red and even more ignorant of what it 
is like for other people to see red. The first situation seems indexical 
in nature and Chalmers gives the example of a physically omniscient 
observer, who has complete physical knowledge, but will have no idea 
of what it is like for Mary to see red. Chalmers explains that the 
                                                          
4  Reflexive truth-conditions, according to Perry (2002, p. 232) are ‘conditions on the 
things we take for granted in getting to the subject matter, namely, the words them-
selves’, which means this content is not part of the content of the subject content but 
rather part of content as a whole (Baker, 2013). 
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‘ignorance does not evaporate from the objective viewpoint’ 
(Chalmers, 2004, p. 187). He further claims that, for any observer, 
‘there will be an epistemic gap between complete physical knowledge 
and this sort of phenomenal knowledge’ (ibid.). Based on this, 
Chalmers concludes that facts about consciousness do not supervene 
on the physical. 
I take issue with Perry’s indexical response to the knowledge argu-
ment because I believe that a new fact is learned and, further, that it is 
more than just a belief indexically attached to an experience. The 
reason we are able to make specific reference to things through the use 
of indexicals is because there is something particular to reference 
(more detail to follow). On the other hand, I also hold that Chalmers 
has underestimated the role indexicals play in the knowledge argu-
ment. He may be right in pointing out that indexicals do not quite 
address the main concern in the knowledge argument with regards to 
the type of fact learned, but I think he is wrong to dismiss the 
indexical response as implausible or as ‘relatively uninteresting’ 
(Chalmers, 2004). 
Chalmers interestingly claims that ‘even when we give Mary perfect 
knowledge about her indexical relation to everything in the physical 
world, her knowledge of red experiences will not be improved in the 
slightest. In lacking phenomenal knowledge, she lacks far more than 
someone lacking indexical knowledge’ (Chalmers, 1996, p. 144). 
There are a few points I find problematic about Chalmers’ above 
claim. Providing Mary with perfect knowledge of her indexical 
relation to everything in the world would require her having access to 
these objects and this would subsequently mean that her knowledge of 
a red experience improves greatly. It has been pointed out5 that it is 
possible for Mary to learn even a few indexical facts about her 
position in the world, and given a complete objective knowledge she 
would be able to make many/any indexical claims about the world 
from within the black and white room. This is possible, but these 
indexical expressions would lack the kind of subject truth-conditions 
which Perry has argued for and are therefore baseless in their 
descriptions. It is entirely possible that there are indexical truths which 
are physical facts about physical experiences which cannot be truth-
fully generated in the black and white room. 
                                                          
5  An anonymous referee pointed this out to me for which I am grateful. 
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The following reworking is a possible indexical response to the 
knowledge argument: 
 (1) Mary learns all non-indexical physical facts. (From Perry’s 
arguments against the possibility that she knows all indexical 
physical facts.) 
 (2) Mary learns a new fact. 
 Hence, (3): Either Mary learns a non-physical fact, or Mary 
learns an indexical physical fact. 
This conclusion is disjunctive, with one disjunct being the dualist con-
clusion Jackson originally aimed for, and the other being compatible 
with physicalism. Thus, even if this reworking defeats the knowledge 
argument for dualism, the physicalist should not consider it a satis-
factory response as it stands. This response remains unsatisfactorily 
neutral as to the physicality of these indexical facts. Based on this, we 
have equal reason to question the existence of physical indexical facts 
as we do the existence of non-physical indexical facts (see Chalmers, 
1996 and 2004). For this reason, I conclude that Perry’s response to 
the knowledge argument is not a satisfactory resting point for a 
physicalist. 
The physicalist should explore the nature of indexical physical facts 
— to discover if the truth-conditions of such expressions may indeed 
supervene upon the physical, which I argue they do. There is some-
thing interesting about indexicals that hasn’t really been explored in 
great detail and that has to do with the categorization of facts. I turn to 
Kevin Mulligan and Fabrice Correia (2013) who claim that ‘a fact is 
just a true truth-bearer; a fact is just an obtaining state of affairs; 
[and/or] a fact is just a sui generis type of entity in which objects 
exemplify properties or stand in relations’. To state that the indexical 
expression ‘I am sitting at my table’ does not satisfy these criteria 
would be erroneous. This is important for the next move that I make 
with regards to the different kinds of facts available to us. ‘Jill is 
sitting at that table’ is a fact about a human being, and thus an object, 
in relation to a table, which is surely an object exemplifying 
‘properties’. Let’s call the fact that is referred to by a true indexical 
expression an ‘indexical fact’. Therefore, an indexical fact is a fact 
about this particular table here or that particular person over there. 
Perry claims that Mary learns a form of recognition, as a belief is 
attached to a subjective experience. In line with Nemirow (2007) and 
Lewis (1988), Perry (2002) attributes this new kind of knowledge to 
an ability or belief rather than a new kind of fact. However, given the 
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definition provided by Mulligan and Correia (2013), I argue that Mary 
comes to learn a new fact. This is important for my view because I 
show that the knowledge argument fails to show that indexicals can 
and should be recognized as more than just a belief. This brings me to 
another important point. 
The argument set out in the knowledge argument either treats 
indexicals and non-indexicals as the same type of knowledge or does 
not consider the truth-makers of indexical expressions to be facts. 
Therefore, according to Jackson, non-physical knowledge is learned. 
It is important to note that it does not automatically follow that the 
new knowledge is non-physical based on this erroneous assumption 
that what she learns is no new fact. The above point shows that there 
are indexical facts Mary can come to learn upon her release. In 
addition, it seems the unintentional assumption in the argument is that 
there is no difference between indexical facts and non-indexical facts 
and that both are the same kind of knowledge and that both can be 
learned in the black and white room. But this seems erroneous because 
we have already seen that she cannot learn all of both kinds of facts in 
the black and white room. In the knowledge argument, the difference 
between indexicals and non-indexicals is not the focus, which is a 
pity, given that the kind of fact learned is of an indexical nature. 
It appears that the truth-conditions of indexical claims do not super-
vene on what is expressible in the language of the physical sciences. 
But they do, however, supervene on a particular physical fact (a 
bifactualist term as discussed in the next section). It can be argued that 
particular physical facts are the supervenience base of indexical 
expressions about physical facts. It can be argued that there could be 
no difference in the indexical physical facts without the difference in 
the particular physical facts. For Mary to say ‘I see this red rose’ 
would require a particular physical fact of the existence of a particular 
red rose. If Mary said ‘I see this red rose’ and the particular physical 
fact is that of a white rose, her indexical expression would be false. A 
correct and true indexical expression is dependent on a particular 
physical fact. If the particular physical fact changes, so does the 
indexical expression. 
In the next section of this paper I propose something a bit stronger 
and show that the fact Mary comes to learn is physical. I do this by 
introducing a new view called bifactualism. Bifactualism is a response 
to the knowledge argument and it is primarily a physicalist point of 
view which takes the idea of indexicals and develops it further into a 
possibly new physicalist account of experience which shows that 
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indexical facts facilitate the learning of particular physical facts and 
supervene on particular physical facts and that Jackson is not justified 
in claiming that indexicals do not make up scientific fact. 
To summarize this section, we have explored the possibility that: 1) 
the language of the physical sciences contains no indexical express-
ions; 2) there are true indexical expressions about physical things and 
particular physical facts provide examples of these; 3) thus, there are 
truths about physical things which are not expressible in the language 
of the physical sciences and the reason for this is because the language 
of the physical sciences is not about indexicals. 
4. The Bifactualist Response 
Bifactualism holds that there are two types of physical facts, which I 
call general physical facts and particular physical facts. The majority 
of facts which are expressible in the language of the physical sciences 
are general facts. A general fact (in the sense of what is expressible in 
the language of the physical sciences) is a truth-bearer about objects 
or things in the world which share defining underlying characteristics. 
For example, a general fact6 about tables would include their general 
function, structure, and possible purpose. When we speak of tables 
using general facts we make statements starting with forms of words 
such as ‘all tables are…’ or ‘no tables are…’. When we make state-
ments or claims such as these, we make use of quantified generalities. 
There are at least two ways in which general facts are used. One is to 
make use of universal quantifiers which are statements about all or 
none of a group, and the other is to make use of existential quantifiers 
which is to show the existence of something. An example of the latter 
would be ‘some x is f’ or ‘there exists an x such that x is f’ (Mautner, 
2005, p. 634). A universal quantifier of P(x) is the statement ‘P(x) for 
all values x in the universe’ which in formal logical notation is written 
as ∀x∈D, P(x). The language of the physical sciences refer to objects 
in the world using general statements such as these in order to grasp a 
general understanding of the way the world is. 
                                                          
6  When I write of generalities and particulars, I do not want the reader to confuse this 
with discussions about universals and particulars. A universal is ‘something shared by 
different particular objects’ (Mautner, 2005, p. 633). A particular would be an instance 
of the universal. Therefore, what I’m trying to express here has very little to do with 
universals or particulars in the way it is generally understood in metaphysics. General 
physical facts and particular physical facts are bifactualist terms. 
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The physical sciences, and what is expressible in the language of the 
physical sciences, provide information in such a way that it can cover 
a lot of subjects and concepts without going into much detail. The 
Mill-Ramsey-Lewis account ‘proposes that laws of nature be regarded 
as axioms or theorems that appear in those deductive systems that 
strike the best balance between strength of description and simplicity’ 
(Jackson and Smith, 2005, p. 797). The strength of a system is 
normally decided based on the number of true facts about the world it 
can capture. This would mean that the higher number of true facts the 
physical sciences have about the world, the stronger it is as a 
deductive system. 
Importantly, having access to general information about all the 
objects in the world will allow persons to make reference to objects 
they have never encountered. For instance, I have never encountered 
(in person at least) black jaguars before, but I can still make reference 
to them. I could say something like: ‘black jaguars mostly live in 
South America.’ The individual objects in the world which the per-
ceiver has never encountered have distinct features, characteristics, or 
properties which the general descriptions will fail to describe. For 
instance, I can make reference to black jaguars in general but I cannot 
make reference to a particular black jaguar which is just now drinking 
from the River Amazon. It may be a particular shade of black or it 
may have a scar above its left eye, and this information I am not 
privileged to with the kind of information available in textbooks (what 
is expressible in the language of the physical sciences). 
When I write of the particularity of an object, it does seem 
reminiscent of trope theory,7 and here I’d like to show how bifactual-
ism differs. According to Mautner (2005, pp. 626–7), trope theory 
deals with ‘abstract particulars. An example would be the redness of a 
particular red surface… they are not concrete: they are abstract in that 
they almost always come in clusters and can be grasped only by 
means of abstraction’. Maurin (2014) writes that, with regards to a 
particular red rose, ‘[g]iven trope theory, this rose is red because it is 
partly constituted by a redness-trope’. Importantly, trope theory is an 
ontological theory and bifactualism is a response to the knowledge 
                                                          
7  An anonymous referee pointed out that some points made in bifactualism theory seem 
reminiscent of trope theory. A lot can be said about trope theory but I will not go into a 
lot of detail here as it is beyond the scope of this paper. My main objective here is to 
briefly show how it may contribute to bifactualism and how it is different from 
bifactualism. 
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argument and a response to the problem of experience. The 
bifactualist does not consider trope theory to be of major relevance to 
bifactualist theory because, regardless of whether or not a black jaguar 
has a different kind of blackness to that of a second black jaguar, the 
bifactualist argues that the particular jaguar drinking from the River 
Amazon (as a whole entity) is providing the perceiver with a kind of 
knowledge she cannot have access to with what is expressible in the 
language of the physical sciences. It may be the case that Mary sees a 
prowl of black jaguars and some are a lighter shade of black while 
others are a darker shade of black. It would mean that the black 
jaguars instantiate blackness-tropes. Some trope theorists (Campbell, 
1990) argue that each individual jaguar has a distinct instance of a 
blackness-trope and that this particular blackness-trope will change if 
swapped or shared with another blackness-trope, thereby losing its 
distinct particularity. They can, however, resemble one another. The 
bifactualist has no opinion in this regard, it rather claims that regard-
less of the ontological status of an object (therefore the trope status of 
an object) there is something particular to be had in any experience. 
Further, I’m going to give more examples of particular physical facts 
which are not expressible in the language of the physical sciences. 
Let’s use whales as an example and show what facts about whales 
are expressible in the language of the physical sciences. Whales are 
mammals because they breathe air, they are warm-blooded, and give 
birth to live young and feed them as mammals do. Whales also ‘have a 
smooth, sleek shape. Instead of arms and legs, whales have fins and a 
sideway tail called a fluke’ (Greenberg, 2003, p. 20). From this 
description, if Mary were to leave the black and white room she’d be 
able to identify a whale and even make the indexical claim: ‘this is a 
whale’ or ‘this is what it is like for me to see a whale’. But there is 
something that the story of the physical sciences left out and Mary 
would discover this when she sees her first whale. Perhaps this 
particular whale she is seeing for the first time has been harpooned 
once or this whale has been afflicted with barnacles. Suddenly the 
description having ‘a smooth, sleek shape’ does not necessarily apply 
to this particular whale. 
Mary learns two things from this particular experience of this 
particular whale: first, she is in the position to truly make an indexical 
claim and, second, this indexical claim depends on the existence of 
this particular whale with its particularity she would not have known 
about in the black and white room. She can say of this particular 
whale, ‘this whale has been injured and my textbooks never told me 
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about this whale and how it was injured’. All these indexical claims 
depend on the particular physical facts about this whale. 
The language of the physical sciences can tell me about books. It 
can tell me about bookshelves and it can tell me about coffee stains. 
However, it cannot tell me about a particular book I have on my book-
shelf and that on page 47 you’ll find a coffee stain. Not a perfectly 
round coffee stain but rather a marred coffee stain made by a chip in 
my mug, which again, textbooks could not tell me about. The 
language of the physical sciences can tell me about cars and it can be 
tell me about scratches and dents. However, the language of the 
physical sciences cannot tell me about the scratch and dents on my 
particular car, the ones just above the front left tyre. 
Particular facts are about objects which exist at a particular place 
and time and have unique characteristics. These facts are particular or 
specific and therefore do not satisfy conditions of universally 
quantified statements. Universally quantified statements will make 
claims about all or some things. There are particular facts about a 
particular object at a particular space and time which the story of the 
physical sciences cannot tell me about. There are facts which escape 
the physicalist story and some of these facts are facts about particu-
lars. These facts are more than general facts with indexicals added to 
them. Teed Rockwell observes that 
Fido will have a distinctive pattern to his fur, and flecks of dirt on his 
feet from his morning walk, Rover will be bigger and taller than Fido 
and have a slightly crooked left incisor that he inherited from his sire. 
None of these factors is accounted for when we classify Rover and Fido 
as dogs, and this doesn’t bother us, because we can sense that the con-
cept of dog somehow captures what Fido and Rover have in common. 
(Rockwell, 2005, pp. 121–2) 
The obvious commonality between Fido and Rover is that parts of 
their description can be understood or known through general physical 
facts.8 Their being dogs with fur and four paws, for instance. 
                                                          
8  Rockwell further claims that ‘knowledge of particulars is only acquired by applying 
universals to them’ (2006). I’m a bit wary of referring to generalities (as I have outlined 
them) as universals for the reason I noted above in footnote 4, and I think Rockwell 
should be careful here too. He makes some interesting claims, but I think he could have 
done more to show the difference between the use of a universal and the use of a 
generality in science. In agreement with Rockwell, the problem with applying 
generalities to a particular object such as Moby Dick is that we end up knowing very 
little about what is particular about him. 
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Let’s say we can accept that there are two kinds of facts that Mary 
can come to know. The challenge now is to show how they are both 
physical. The physical sciences express their findings using general 
facts; however, there are some facts which are not expressible in the 
language of the physical sciences which are facts about the particular. 
It is not the case that ‘only propositions expressible in the language of 
physics can be true, or that only individuals in the domain of physics 
can exist’ (Haugeland, 1998, p. 101). It is entirely possible that facts 
can exist outside of what is expressible in the language of the physical 
sciences, or that facts can exist outside of what is expressible through 
the use of quantifiers and universals. 
I admit that Mary is lacking knowledge in the black and white room, 
but I do not agree that this knowledge is non-physical. We have 
determined that it is possible that Mary learns non-indexical facts (and 
some indexical facts) in the black and white room and comes to learn 
indexical facts once outside. An indexical fact is one about an object 
in a spatio-temporal sphere, for example: that rose, this rose, these 
roses, etc. A non-indexical fact is a fact about things in general and 
requires no relation to an object in a spatio-temporal relation, for 
example: a rose, many roses, all roses, etc. Therefore, indexical facts 
are not dependent on general physical facts but are dependent on 
particular physical facts. 
So far I have shown that the indexical response to the knowledge 
argument is compatible with physicalism only once we show a 
distinction between general and particular physical facts. Chalmers 
argues that indexical expressions do not supervene on the physical and 
this may seem so without the distinction between general and 
particular facts. Once we see the distinction, we know that indexical 
expressions are dependent on particular physical facts — there is 
clearly a relationship of supervenience going on here. A change in a 
particular physical fact will result in a change of an indexical physical 
fact. 
An indexical is about access to the facts which are not expressible in 
the language of the physical sciences, and these facts are particular 
physical facts. An indexical fact is a fact about an object in relation to 
a location and time. Bifactualism claims that this information is not 
expressible in the language of the physical sciences because we cannot 
use quantifiers to express this information. More so, this information 
is very particular. An indexical term is not going to cover the particu-
larity of the object; it is going to point it out. What this means is to say 
‘this rose’ does very little to explain that this rose has 10 thorns and is 
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a lighter shade of red than the rest in the bouquet.9 This is the crucial 
difference between the bifactualist response and the indexical 
response. Indexicalism is essentially about location and access. Bifact-
ualism is about particularity of unique characteristics which is 
ungraspable in the language of the physical sciences. To simplify this 
further, indexical facts may make it possible, in some instances, to 
know some of these particular facts because indexical physical facts 
supervene on particular physical facts. 
Making an inference to the best explanation, I argue that the 
indexical disambiguation of the knowledge argument initially does not 
tell us whether the second disjunct is physicalist-friendly or not. How-
ever, by showing how indexical facts can be particular physical facts 
and that these are not expressible in the language of the physical 
sciences shows that this second disjunct is physicalist-friendly. 
Particular physical facts do not supervene on what is expressible in the 
language of the physical sciences. Indexical physical facts supervene 
on particular physical facts. Therefore indexical physical facts do not 
supervene on what is expressible in the language of the physical 
sciences. 
This would mean the following for Mary: when she sits in the black 
and white room, she learns about roses in general. She learns that they 
have thorns, they have stems, they are a variety of colours, they have 
petals, etc. She has a good grasp of general physical facts about roses. 
Once she leaves the black and white room for the first time, she sees a 
red rose up close and suddenly notices that it is not quite the way the 
general facts portrayed it to be. This particular rose (making use of an 
indexical here) has five thorns, one thorn is placed strangely close to 
the petals, the stem is crooked and bent, and the rose has lost at least 
half of its petals. These facts about this particular rose she could not 
have learned in the black and white room because science couldn’t 
have told her these things. Therefore, there were facts missing in the 
black and white room and only once she was able to leave the black 
and white room and come to know the rose as a particular was she 
able to see that these particular physical facts are indeed not reducible 
to the general physical facts. Once she has access to the particular 
physical facts, she can make truthful indexical claims because 
indexical facts supervene on particular physical facts. 
                                                          
9  Please see above comments about trope theory. 
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So what does this say about what we learn through experience? 
Drawing on Rockwell (2005, p. 122) again, ‘how can we possibly 
develop a general concept when we are studying what is experienced 
as one awesomely unique case? No matter what we say about con-
sciousness there will always be something left out, just as there will 
always be something left out when we say Rover is a dog’. Mary 
learns general facts from what is expressible in the language of the 
physical sciences about an experience she is going to have, and this 
information is mostly only of a general kind. Therefore, when she 
leaves the room she learns something new, she learns a particular fact 
and this fact is physical. The feeling of what it is like can therefore be 
seen as a species of a particular physical fact. 
Like the indexical response, bifactualism defeats the knowledge 
argument by disambiguating and thus leaving the knowledge argu-
ment with a disjunctive conclusion, of which one disjunct is com-
patible with dualism and the other is compatible with physicalism — 
as follows: 
P1: Mary learns all general physical facts and some particular 
physical facts in the black and white room. 
P2: Mary leaves the room and learns a new fact. 
P3: Either Mary learns a non-physical fact, or Mary learns a 
particular physical fact. 
Again, this is disjunctive; but the physicalism-compatible disjunct of 
the bifactualist response appears more appealing than the physicalism-
compatible disjunct of the indexical response. It is highly plausible 
that particular physical facts exist, and it doesn’t seem altogether 
implausible that such facts are what Mary comes to learn. Moreover, 
her learning particular physical facts would be compatible with the 
causal closure of the physical. Secondly, this disjunction is appealing 
to dualists because it allows for the fact that Mary does not learn all 
physical facts in the black and white room and she does indeed come 
to learn something new. 
To conclude this section, bifactualism seems the best response to the 
knowledge argument because Mary learns a particular physical fact 
not expressible in the language of the physical sciences. She couldn’t 
have learned this fact in the black and white room because firstly she 
was never in the correct relation to an object to truthfully make any 
indexical claim and, since a particular physical fact can be seen as a 
referent of an indexical fact, she was not able to have access to the 
particular physical fact. 
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5. Objections to Bifactualism 
An objection to bifactualism would be to say that if Mary had access 
to a CCTV camera and viewed a particular red rose outside of her 
room, and therefore had access to particular physical facts, like how 
many thorns it has, etc., she still would not know what it is like to see 
red.10 The bifactualist would respond that it is not the case that all 
particular physical facts are facts about consciousness. It does, how-
ever, claim that all facts about her consciousness are particular 
physical facts. Mary is in the position to know some particular 
physical facts in the black and white room and she may not be in the 
position to know others, like the particular physical facts that 
accompany her experience of seeing red. 
Another possible objection to bifactualism would be to say that 
surely the physical sciences express some facts as particular or at least 
as indexical. For instance, this test tube contains 5ml of liquid. Surely 
Mary would have access to this kind of particular fact (an indexical) 
that the language of the physical sciences can tell her about. The 
indexical used in this particular objection is not the kind of physical 
fact in the sense which Jackson himself originally meant to discuss in 
the knowledge argument. For Jackson, the kinds of facts available to 
Mary were scientific data which were fundamentally objective and 
general. Secondly, bifactualism does not claim that Mary can have no 
access to particular physical facts within the black and white room. It 
does, however, claim that there are many particular physical facts 
which she cannot come to know within the black and white room. For 
instance, when Mary picks up one of her black and white textbooks in 
the black and white room, then she can come to learn the indexical 
‘this textbook of mine’. She therefore has learned a particular physical 
fact in the black and white room. However, Mary can never truly say 
‘this red textbook of mine’ because the indexical remains meaningless 
given that indexicals are dependent on particular physical facts and it 
is a fact that Mary does not have access to a red textbook in her room. 
A third objection11 to the bifactualist is that it may be possible that 
particular facts do not go beyond what can be captured by general 
facts. An example: ‘this (indexical) whale (general category) has a 
harpoon mark (general category) and barnacles (general category).’ 
                                                          
10  My gratitude to Dean Peters for providing me with this objection. 
11  An anonymous referee provided me with this objection for which I am thankful. 
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The bifactualist would provide two points as a response: firstly, as has 
already been pointed out, a meaningful indexical is dependent on a 
particular physical fact, not on a general physical fact, therefore using 
the indexical ‘this whale’ could not be expressed unless a particular 
physical fact of this particular whale exists. Secondly, general 
physical facts are truth-bearers about objects or things in the world 
which share underlying characteristics, and particular physical facts 
are truth-bearers about a particular object which satisfy one or all of 
these underlying characteristics.12 The general physical facts about 
whales are not going to tell Mary much about the particular whale she 
sees before her. This particular whale swimming at a particular place 
at a particular time either satisfies the underlying characteristics she 
learns about through her access to general physical facts or it doesn’t. 
There are general physical facts about whales in this world and there 
are particular physical facts about particular whales to be experienced. 
Just as there are general physical facts about conscious experience, 
there are no (or at least very few) general physical facts about Mary’s 
consciousness. Just as she is incapable of learning a particular 
physical fact about a particular whale in her black and white room 
(because of the kind of knowledge available to her), she is incapable 
of learning certain particular physical facts of her conscious experi-
ence within the black and white room. 
A final objection to bifactualism13 is the claim that ‘there seem to be 
general phenomenal truths that aren’t deducible from the general 
physical truths, and particular phenomenal truths are not deducible 
from even a full knowledge of particular physical truths’. The 
bifactualist response to this is as follows: according to the causal 
closure of the physical, every event has a sufficient physical cause. It 
would thus be the case that either these general phenomenal truths 
which are not deducible from general physical facts are epiphenom-
enal or they are somehow reducible to general physical facts. It is also 
the case that either these particular physical truths which are not 
deducible from even a full knowledge of particular physical truths are 
                                                          
12  This may sound reminiscent of verificationism whereby the verification principle is 
such that a statement is meaningful if it is empirically verifiable. For a statement to be 
empirically verifiable it must be possible to confirm the meaningfulness of a statement 
by empirically experiencing/observing what is being communicated (Ayer, 1936). The 
bifactualist is not making verificationist claims per se, but it is possible that particular 
physical facts can confirm or disconfirm general physical facts. 
13  An anonymous referee provided me with this objection for which I am thankful. 
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epiphenomenal or they are somehow reducible to particular physical 
facts. 
As a second response to the above objection, I turn to Paul 
Churchland. In response to Jackson’s knowledge argument, 
Churchland (1989, p. 2) argues that Jackson’s argument is formally 
valid, but that the argument ‘continues to see the same equivocation 
found in [earlier] castings of his argument’.14 Churchland calls this the 
parallel knowledge argument (1989, p. 4). Churchland suggests that 
the knowledge argument is set out in such a way that it does not 
matter what Mary learns in the black and white room, there is always 
something to learn beyond the black and white room, be it knowledge 
of the physical or non-physical. If she learns all physical facts in the 
black and white room, she is still lacking something he calls knowl-
edge by acquaintance.15 Conversely, if she learns all non-physical 
facts in the black and white room, she is again lacking knowledge by 
acquaintance. The problem here is the lack of knowledge by acquaint-
ance which cannot, for Mary, happen in the room. Therefore, the 
bifactualist would argue that even if one were to have complete 
knowledge of all general phenomenal truths in the black and white 
room, one would still lack knowledge of general physical truths and 
vice versa. The same goes for particular physical facts and 
phenomenal physical facts. 
A representation of this will look something like this: 
P1: Mary learns all particular phenomenal facts in the black and 
white room (which we have shown is not possible). 
P2: Mary leaves the room and learns a new fact. 
P3: Mary learns a particular physical fact. 
Or, 
P1: Mary learns all particular physical facts in the black and white 
room (which we have shown is not possible). 
P2: Mary leaves the room and learns a new fact. 
P3: Mary learns a particular phenomenal fact. 
                                                          
14  Churchland refers here to the canonical representation of the knowledge argument 
Jackson set forth in the addendum: from ‘What Mary Didn’t Know’ (Jackson, 1986). 
15  Which, very simply put, means learning or being put in the situation where one is able 
to experience ‘the feeling of what it is like’ (Nagel, 1974). 
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Either way, according to the above objection, Mary will lack some 
kind of knowledge and this is what the bifactualist is trying to avoid. It 
would be difficult to show that a book, for instance, is a phenomenal 
fact based on the understanding that books in general do not have 
phenomenal states. The language of the physical sciences can tell me 
about the physical properties of the books you have on your shelf, but 
not that they exist and are on your shelf. Similarly, what is expressible 
in the language of the physical sciences cannot tell me anything 
particular about the office in which you find yourself, or the chair in 
which you sit, or even about you reading this paper (Swanepoel, 
2013). If particular physical facts are phenomenal because they cannot 
be expressed in the language of the physical sciences, then it follows 
that the fact that you hold that particular pen in your hand is a 
phenomenal fact. ‘Yet, all the physical properties of that state of 
affairs can be described by the physical sciences — a physical 
description can fully describe it, except for the particularity’ (ibid.). 
This leaves us with a peculiar and contradictory conclusion that a non-
physical fact ‘satisfies an exhaustive description in the language of the 
physical sciences’. This clearly does not work. It certainly appears to 
be the case that particular facts are physical facts. 
6. Conclusion 
Jackson challenges the physicalist by suggesting a much discussed 
thought experiment called the knowledge argument. The knowledge 
argument is so highly debateable because both physicalists and 
dualists struggle to answer the question of what facts, according to 
Jackson, escape the physicalist story. The physicalist claims that if a 
fact escapes the physical story then it either does not exist, or is some-
how reducible to the physical. Jackson argues that if a fact escapes a 
physical story then it is non-physical. I argue otherwise. There are 
facts which are not included in what is expressible in the language of 
the physical sciences. 
In this paper, I argued for a new physicalist account I call 
bifactualism. Bifactualism claims that there are two kinds of physical 
facts. The one kind of fact is what the physical sciences are capable of 
expressing (the general physical fact), and the other kind of fact 
(particular physical fact) the language of the physical sciences is 
closed off to. Bifactualism is a physicalist account which, in some 
way, is compatible with some dualist claims because it allows the 
dualist the claim that something is missing from what is expressible in 
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the language of the physical sciences. Bifactualism also allows 
physicalists a way out of this dilemma by recognizing a physical fact 
(a particular physical fact) which is not expressible in the language of 
the physical sciences. 
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